IT Crime
3G mobile phones

Description

Telecommunication providers are introducing a new generation of mobile telephone technology, (third generation, or 3G), which will enable increased data-handling rates. This will allow mobile telephones to offer new features such as video streaming, video conference calling, transmission of video calls, and enhanced e-mail and web-browsing capabilities. There is considerable variety in the uptake across European countries: for example, in Italy, nearly 50% of mobile telephones are 3G units. In Japan, uptake has been even more rapid – up to 60% of units are 3G capable.

Criminal possibilities

• There is a potential criminal market in stolen units given their high unit value. 'Chipping and pinning', the reprogramming of phones and personal identification numbers, is already widely available at the street level for pre-3G phones. If this becomes possible with 3G units, it could lead to a rise in related thefts.

• When units are stolen, there are issues related to the security of any sensitive data held on the units. This is a serious problem with 3G phones as they are in effect a crossover between telephones and portable computers. Data held on the units such as card or account numbers could be used to commit further fraud or theft.

• The streaming video and digital-imaging capabilities of the units hold the potential for misuse by online child abusers and voyeurs as surveillance/anti-surveillance devices by criminals. There is also the potential for use in extortion and blackmail. There have already been reports of use in election fraud, i.e. transmitting a live picture from within the election booth.

• Units may fall prey to Trojan-style attacks in an attempt to capture sensitive data either stored on the phone or transmitted via the unit, e.g. bank or card details. Such attacks have already been observed in the mobile and PDA markets over the past two years.

• The increased e-mail and video-conferencing capabilities open up the possibility that criminals will use such units as secure communication tools. This is likely to rise if instant messaging services become available on 3G phones.

• If such units are used to carry out voting in public elections, there is a danger that cloned or misappropriated phones could be used to skew results. This has already been a concern in Italy and Taiwan, and many countries are considering mobile-telephone-based voting systems.
• There is a possibility that re-dialler programs loaded onto the phone during web surfing could redirect web access or dial premium rate lines without the user’s knowledge, resulting in large telephone bills. The UK computer trade press has reported a rise in malicious re-dialler programs being disseminated, primarily by offshore premium line service pornography providers.

• The use of 3G phones to access the Internet and other web services may in itself encourage a new wave of virus writing and dissemination activity, increasing resource demands on both anti-virus providers and law enforcement.

Suggested responses

• Work should begin on methodologies around the collection of evidence for use in subsequent prosecutions. This should include investigating the possibility of tracking the user’s location. Further research should be targeted at capturing digital picture/video evidence, which could be based on methods used in Japan.

• Law enforcement should consult and work closely with industry so that the current knowledge and expertise base can be established and maintained. This will also allow a full range of threat assessment.

• Law enforcement should work with unit and service providers to explore methods for effectively blocking illegal content and services such as online child sexual abuse.

• Law enforcement should work closely with unit manufacturers and service providers on anti-theft protection for units and anti-fraud systems for service providers. Means for disabling stolen units, either on the unit itself or at the service provider level, should be explored.

• Law enforcement should establish liaison networks to facilitate cross-border investigations in which 3G systems are used by criminals.

• Law enforcement should seek to identify a relevant working body to monitor and report on developments in connection with 3G capabilities and services. A further area of monitoring should be uptake and usage by both the general public and organized crime groups. The working body should report on developments regularly to interested parties.